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LEGISLATION
CHILD ABDUCTION BY A RELATIVE: MARYLAND
ENACTS A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE TO
DETER PARENTAL CHILD-STEALING
I.

INTRODUCTION

An equity court decrees that one parent to a divorce proceeding
shall be the lawful custodian of the children. Displeased with the
arrangement, the non-custodial parent takes the children and moves
to another state. Absent extraordinary circumstances indicating
that the act was committed to protect the safety or welfare of the
children, the authority of the court decree presumably should invoke
some legal process to effect an immediate return of the children to
their lawful custodian. Unfortunately, courts and law enforcement
personnel have been ill-equipped to effectuate an immediate return of
parentally abducted children, which has led to a seriously high
incidence of parental child abductions.
For instance, one Maryland mother was awarded legal custody
in seven different states, but de facto custody remained with the
father who abducted the child following each custody award. l
Furthermore~ a recent study indicates that as many as 100,000
children are abducted or detained by parents each year. 2 In 1978, the
Maryland General Assembly reacted to this problem 3 by enacting a
misdemeanor statute proscribing parental child abductions. 4 This
article will analyze this legislation after reviewing the legal
problems which led to its enactment.

II. THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. The Civil Law

A lawful custodian has two civil courses of action to follow in
attempting to regain actual custody of a parentally abducted child.
1. Mouat, When Parents Kidnap Their Own Children, The Christian Science
Monitor, Jan. 4, 1979, at 17, col. 1.
2. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and

Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifica·
tions, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 978, 979 n.5 (1977).
3. Maryland's first legislative step occurred in 1975 with the adoption of the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 184-207
(Supp. 1978). This legislation was designed to remedy the civil side of the
problem but included no criminal sanctions. See text accompanying notes 31-35
infra.
4. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 435, 1978 Md. Laws 1581 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 2A (Supp. 1978». Although this article concentrates on the problems
associated with the taking of a child out-of-state by the non-custodial parent, the
new statute also applies to in-state abductions. In fact, if law enforcement
personnel can use the law to apprehend abducting parents while they are in the
state, the major problems in this area would be solved.
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First, he may institute a constructive,5 civil6 contempt proceeding in
the court that rendered the custody decree. 7 Second, if the child has
been removed to another state, the lawful custodian generally must
institute habeas corpus proceedings in that state in order to obtain
the child's return. S
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the taking of a
child in violation of a custody decree constitutes actionable
constructive, civil contempt. 9 Maryland Rule P4 provides that a
lawful custodian may petition the court that rendered the custody
decree for a contempt order.lO The court must then issue a show
cause orderl l and serve it upon the abducting parent pursuant to
Maryland Rule 104. 12 If the abducting parent fails to answer the
charge, the case may be heard ex parte. 13 Once an abducting parent
is held in contempt of court for violating the custody decree, a court
may issue a bench warrant or writ of attachment directing a sheriff
to take the abducting parent into custody until the contempt is
purged by returning the child to the lawful custodian. 14
5. Con tempts are classified as to the place of their commission: a direct contempt is
"committed in the presence of the court, or so near to the court as to interrupt its
proceedings," Md. Rule PI a; whereas a constructive contempt is committed out
of the presence of the court. Md. Rule PI b. See generally 17 C.J .S. Contempt §§ 3,
4 (1963).
6. Con tempts are also classified as civil or criminal. Civil contempt proceedings are
brought to preserve the rights of private parties and to aid in the enforcement of
the court's decree, State v. Roll, 267 Md. 714, 728, 298 A.2d 867, 876 (1973);
whereas criminal contempt proceedings vindicate the dignity and authority of
the court and the state is generally the prosecutor. Id. at 727, 298 A.2d at 875. A
civil contempt need be proved only by a preponderance of the evidence and,
because it is remedial in nature, it must provide that the defendant may purge
himself. Id. at 728, 298 A.2d at 876. A criminal contempt must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, and because it is intended to punish for past misconduct, it
may be purely punitive without provision for purging. Id.
The determination of whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal can
be difficult. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has delineated five factors which
generally point to a civil contempt:
(1) the complainant is usually a private person as opposed to the State;
(2) the contempt proceeding is entitled in the original action and filed as
a continuation thereof as opposed to a separate and independent action;
(3) holding the defendant in contempt affords relief to a private party; (4)
the relief requested is primarily for the benefit of the complainant; (5) the
acts complained of do not of themselves constitute crimes or conduct by
the defendant so wilful or contumelious that the court is impelled to act
on its own motion.
Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 317, 226 A.2d 304, 307 (1967).
7. See text accompanying notes 9-14 infra.
8. See 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habeas Corpus § 99 (1968); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 124
(1976). See text accompanying notes 19 & 20 infra.
9. Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 226 A.2d 304 (1967).
10. Md. Rule P4(a).
11. Id. at P4(b)(1)(a).
12. Id. at P4(b)(1)(c).
13. Id. at P4(c).
14. Cf. In re Lee, 170 Md. 43,53, 183 A. 560, 564, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680 (1936) ("If,
on the other hand, the accused does not, by his answer, fully deny or justify the
acts charged against him, he may be fined and imprisoned, or such terms
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A contempt proceeding may be futile, however, where the
abducting parent has fled the state. IS Although an abducting parent
who submitted to the jurisdiction of the court in the original custody
proceeding cannot defeat the court's jurisdiction over the child
custody matter for purposes of issuing orders to aid in the
enforcement of its decree,16 leaving the state will negate any
practical effect to the subsequent exercise of jurisdiction because the
court's process does not run beyond the territorial limits of the
state. 17 Some courts, in fact, may decline to act on the theory that
"the court will not do a futile thing"IB when it appears that the
abducting parent has left the state and is unlikely to return.
Absent criminal process, habeas corpus proceedings may be the
only means, other than self-help, to obtain custody of an abducted
child who is removed to another state. Locating the child and
applying to the foreign state for habeas corpus, however, does not
guarantee return of the child. First, abducting parents have
contested the custody issue in habeas corpus proceedings and have
been awarded legal custody.19 Second, even ifthe court rules in favor
of the petitioning parent, the abducting parent may remove the child
to yet another state.
The problematic results of those cases that have awarded
custody to an abducting parent raise the issues of jurisdiction, full
faith and credit, and res judicata. The resolution of these issues has
worked, at times, to the detriment of the original lawful custodian,
and unfortunately has promoted parental child-stealing, forumshopping, and relitigation of the custody issue in other states.20

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.

20.

imposed upon him as the justice of the case may require."); Hare v. Hare, 21 Md.
App. 71, 75, 318 A2d 234, 236 (1974) (abducting parent's confinement should
have been terminated once the children were returned to the custodial parent
because the contempt was purged).
Ct. Winter v. Crowley, 245 Md. 313, 226 A2d 304 (1967) (abducting parent who
removed children out-of·state is immune from service of process, which includes a
writ of attachment directing a sheriff to take the parent into custody until the
contempt is purged, while attending and participating in an unrelated action in
the state). The futility of civil contempt proceedings in this type of case and the
need for criminal penalties to invoke criminal process has long been recognized.
See, e.g., Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023, 1025 (1912).
See Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346, 353 (1913); Policastro v. Policastro,
5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2427, 2428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). See generally Rheinstein,
The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1955).
Compliance with Maryland Rules P4 and 104, however, constitutes due process
of law in the prosecution of constructive contempts. Reamer v. Reamer, 246 Md.
532, 229 A2d 74 (1967).
See note 15 supra.
Pelz v; Pelz, 182 AD. 923, 169 N.Y.S. 430 (1918).
See, e.g., In re Wise, 14 Ariz. App. 125, 481 P.2d 296 (1971); Wagner v. Torrence,
94 Colo. 47, 27 P.2d 1038 (1933); Brown v. Walls, 38 Ill. App. 2d 385, 187 N.E.2d
288 (1962); White v. White, 214 Ind. 405, 15 N.E.2d 86 (1938); Sheehy v. Sheehy,
88 N.H. 223, 186 A 1 (1936); Sprague v. Bucher, 38 Tenn. App. 40, 270 S.W.2d 565
(1953).
See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 194-98 (1971)
[hereafter cited as WEINTRAUB].
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The modem rule recognizes three bases of jurisdiction in child
custody cases: the state of the child's domicile, the state where the
child is physically present (the parens patriae approach), and the
state that has personal jurisdiction over those contesting the custody
issue (normally the parents).21 As a result, two or more states may
have concurrent jurisdiction to grant, deny, or modify a child
custody award. 22 The abducting parent, therefore, may shop around
for another forum in which to relitigate the custody issue.
A sister state, furthermore, is not required to afford full faith and
credit to the original custody decree. 23 Although the United States
Supreme Court has avoided the issue whether the full faith and
credit clause applies to child custody decrees,24 the Court has held
that a custody decree which is subject to modification by the court
which rendered it may be modified by a sister state court. 25 In
Maryland, as in all jurisdictions,26 a child custody decree is based on
existing circumstances and is subject to modification on a showing
of changed circumstances. 27 As a result, courts generally have held
that the facts upon which a custody award is based are res judicata
and cannot be re-examined by another state court; but, a later court
may examine any facts that have occurred since the original decree
and modify the decree when in the best interests of the child. 28
The net result is that time is a crucial factor operating against
the searching parent. The longer the abducting parent can retain de
facto custody of the child, the stronger the case that changed
circumstances require that legal custody be changed for the best

21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 79 (1969). Prior to the late
1940's, the assumption was that one state must have exclusive jurisdiction over
the child. ·The general rule was that the domicile of the child was the only
jurisdictional basis for a child custody order. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAws § 117 (1934); WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, at 194. However, non-domiciliary
states exercised jurisdiction as parens patriae when the child was physically
present in the state. See, e.g., Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 29 P.2d 206
(1934); Wear v. Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606 (1930).
22. See, e.g., Perry v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cty., 7 Cal. App. 3d 236, 240,86
Cal. Rptr. 607,609 (1970); Sami v. Sami, 29 Md. App. 161, 175, 347 A.2d 888, 896
(1975); Potter v. Rosas, 111 N.H. 169, 171, 276 A.2d 922, 923 (19 .-~;; ~EINTRAUB,
supra note 20, at 194-96.
23. See, e.g., Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 52, 27 P.2d 1038, 1040 (1933);
WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, at 196-97.
24. See Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1957); May
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
25. Halvey v. Halvey, 230 U.S. 610 (1947).
26. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 20, at 197.
27. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602(a)(5) (Supp. 1978). See Schwartz v.
Schwartz, 26 Md. App. 427, 431, 338 A.2d 386, 388-89 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Perry v. Superior Court of Contra Costa Cty., 7 Cal. App. 3d 236, 240, 86
Cal. Rptr. 607, 609 (1970); Kruse v. Kruse, 150 Kan. 946, 948, 96 P.2d 849, 850
(1940); Mathews v. Mathews, 24 N.C. App. 551, 211 S.E.2d 513 (1975); Griffin v.
Griffin, 95 Or. 78, 83, 187 P. 598, 601 (1920); In re Saucido, 85 Wash. 2d 653, 657,
538 P.2d 1219. 1222 (1975).

1979]

Parental Child Abduction

613

interests of the child. 29 Conversely, the viability of civil relief for the
victimized parent declines as the length of time required to locate the
child increases. Eventually, self-help may become the only possible
method of regaining actual custody, precipitating an unstable tug-ofwar environment for the child.
The Maryland General Assembly initially responded to the
problem in 1975 by adopting the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act. 30 A major concern of the Act is the deterrence of parental childstealing and .the elimination of forum-shopping and repeated
litigation over the custody issue. 31 The Act is designed to: (1) codify
the concept that one state should have exclusive jurisdiction over the
child,32 thereby avoiding multiple jurisdiction conflicts, (2) counteract judicial decisions denying full faith and credit to custody decrees
by "facilitat[ing] the enforcement of custody decrees of other
states,"33 and (3) deny the abducting parent a court in which to
relitigate the custody issue,34 thereby avoiding forum-shopping by
the abducting parent.
Maryland's adoption of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act cannot in itself eliminate the problem of parental child
abductions. 3s Even in cases where the courts have rigidly applied
full faith and credit and attempted to enforce child custody decrees,
which, in effect, conforms to the dictates of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, non-custodial parents have retained de
facto custody by removing the child to yet another state or another

29. Compare In re Wise, 14 Ariz. App. 125, 481 P.2d 296 (1971) (change of custody to
abducting father upheld notwithstanding unlawful taking from another state five and one-half year period had elapsed and psychiatric evidence indicated that
custody by the abducting father would be in the best interests of the child) with
Deatrick v. Galligan, 18 Ariz. App. 171, 500 P.2d 1159 (1972) (temporary custody
award to abducting father reversed - mother brought habeas corpus proceeding
immediately and court held to have exceeded its jurisdiction in making custody
award).
30. Law of April 22, 1975, ch. 265, 1975 Md. Laws 1338 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE
art. 16, §§ 184-207 (Supp. 1978)).
31. Id. § 184(a)(1), (a)(4Ha)(7).
32. Id. §§ 186, 188.
33. Id. §§ 184(a)(7), 195, 197.
34. Id. § 190.
35. To date, only 31 states have adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act. See [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2454 (noting that North Carolina and
Virginia adopted the Act); [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2435 (noting that
Arkansas adopted the Act); [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2592 (listing the
following states as having adopted the Act: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming); [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2610 (noting that Kansas and
Louisiana adopted the Act). Thus, there are a number of jurisdictions where the
Act may be avoided.
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country.36 In addition, many non-custodial parents abduct their
child with no intention of relitigating the question of custody. A
recent article indicates that these parents have become "so adept at
hiding and covering all traces that nationally only about 10 percent
of all such children are found again."37
Employing the use of law enforcement personnel to track,
extradite and deter this unlawful conduct appears mandated. The
Maryland General Assembly and other state legislatures have
attempted to solve the problem by enacting criminal statutes
specifically targeted at parental child abductions. 3s As indicated in
one commentary, a chief objective of the child abduction offense is
to encourage the child's return to the jurisdiction whose contempt
power can then be used to enforce its custody award. 39

B. The Criminal Law
The taking, detention, or carrying away of a child by a parent
against the will of a court-ordered custodian has been defined
variously as criminal conduct under three related offenses which
had their origin in the English law. 40 False imprisonment and
kidnapping were common law offenses.4l The third, child-stealing,
was originally made a crime by Parliament. 42
False imprisonment involves the· unlawful detention or confinement of a person. 43 It is a statutory crime in some states;44 but,
generally, these statutes are merely declaratory of the common
law. 45 In Maryland, false imprisonment is a common law offense. 46

36. C{. Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2703 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (child
unlawfully taken from mother in California by father and removed to New York,
then Yugoslavia).
37. Mouat, When Parents Kidnap Their Own Children, The Christian Science
Monitor, Jan. 4, 1979, at 17, col. 1-2.
38. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5 (West 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-304 (1973);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A (Supp. 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAw, §§ 135.45, 135.50
(McKinney 1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 25.03 (Vernon 1974); WYo. STAT. §§ 6-4-203, 6-4-204 (1977).
39. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 25.03 note (Vernon 1974).
40. See, e.g., People v. McGinnis, 55 Cal. App. 2d 931, 132 P.2d 30 (1942) (childstealing); Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023 (1912) (kidnapping); In re Peck,
66 Kan. 693, 72 P. 265 (1903) (false imprisonment and kidnapping); State v.
Farrar, 41 N.H. 53 (1860) (kidnapping).
41. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *218.
42. 4 & 5 PHIL. & M., c. 8 (1557). Although child-stealing was not a common law
crime, the common law did provide a civil action for damages. 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *140. The action was in trespass per quod servitium amisit (for
loss of services) and is still a viable cause of action. See Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 4
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2703 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *127.
44. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (West 1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW, §§ 135.05, 135.10
(McKinney 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 20.02 (Vernon 1974).
45. J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, § 102 (1934).
46. Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 38-39, 139 A.2d 209, 216 (1958).
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Kidnapping is false imprisonment aggravated by a carrying
away of the victim to another place. 47 All jurisdictions today have
kidnapping legislation. 48 Some jurisdictions, however, have rendered
their kidnapping statutes inapplicable to cases involving the
unlawful taking of a child by a parent. 49 Maryland did so in 1949. 50
In contrast to false imprisonment and kidnapping, which are
normally crimes only when committed against the will of the person
taken,51 the consent, or non-consent, of the child is immaterial in a
child-stealing prosecution. 52 Child-stealing statutes generally proscribe the taking of a child under a specified age with the intent to
deprive the parent or lawful custodian of custody. 53 The age used in
these statutes varies from twelve to eighteen. 54 .
In 1876, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a childstealing statute [hereafter referred to as the 1876 Child Abduction
Act] that provides criminal sanctions for "[a]ny person who shall
without the color of right" abduct, take or carry away by force or
persuasion, or knowingly secrete or harbor any child under the age
of twelve, or act as an accessory to any of said acts, with the intent
to deprive the parent or lawful custodian of custody. 55 The Maryland
appellate courts have never interpreted the "without the color of

47. Id.; J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, § 103 (1934). The common law required a forcible
taking and a carrying out of the country. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*219. American statutes expanded coverage of the offense to include fraudulent
takings and a carrying within or without the state. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 337 (1976).
48. Note, A Rationale of The Law of Kidnapping, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 540, 541 (1953).
49. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§337, 338 (1976); N.Y.
PENAL LAw, §§ 135.15, 135.30 (McKinney 1975).
50. Law of March 4, 1949, ch. 4, §§ 385, 386, 1949 Md. Laws 7 (now codified as MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 337, 338 (1976».
51. See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 12 Ark. 43 (1851); People v. Marin, 48 Ill. 2d 205, 210, 269
N.E.2d 303, 305 (1971); People v. Cohoon, 315 Ill. App. 259, 42 N.E.2d 969 (1942);
Thompson v. State, 215 Ind. 129, 19 N.E.2d 165 (1939).
52. See, e.g., People v. Marin, 48 Ill. 2d 205, 210, 269 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1971); Drury v.
State, 253 Ind. 392, 395, 254 N.E.2d 335, 336 (1970); Guggenheimer v. Southern
Seminary, Inc., 141 Va. 139, 145, 126 S.E. 72, 74 (1925).
53. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw, ch. 2, § 7 (2d ed. 1969). As originally formulated,
child-stealing consisted of the taking of an unmarried female under the age of
sixteen from her parents. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 540, 551 (1953). Modem statutes, however, have broadened the
offense to include any child regardless of sex. Id. at 552.
54. E.g., COLO REv. STAT. § 18-3-302, 18-3-304 (1973) (under 18 years); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-42-3-3 (Burns 1979) (under 14 years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 2, 2A
(Supp. 1978) (under 12 years); N.Y. PENAL LAw, § 135.45 (McKinney 1975) (under
16 years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975) (under 14 years); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-303 (1978) (under 16 years). Some statutes merely say any
minor child. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 278 (West 1979).
55. Law of April 18, 1876, ch. 324, § 2, 1876 Md. Laws 557 (now codified as MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976». Prior to enactment of the 1978 Child Abduction Act, the
Maryland Commission on Criminal Law indicated that the 1876 Child
Abduction Act was applicable to parental child abduction cases. MARYLAND
COMM'N ON CRIMINAL LAw, REPORT AND PART I OF THE PROPOSED CRIMINAL
CODE 196 (1972).
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right" language of the statute. Other state courts, however, have
held that a parent ousted of custody by a court order has no right to
take a child in violation of such order and cannot avail himself of a
color of right defense in a child-stealing prosecution. 56
In practice, however, this conduct has rarely been prosecuted. 57
One theory for the lack of prosecution is that the sanctions provided
by child-stealing statutes have been generally too severe to warrant
use against a parental offender. 58 For instance, Maryland's 1876
Child Abduction Act carries a maximum sentence of twenty years
imprisonment. 59 Mitigating factors, such as the affection motivating
the natural parent and the absence of any physical threat of harm to
the child, probably have resulted in the bypass of this criminal
sanction in parental child abduction cases. 60 The Maryland General
Assembly reacted by creating a new misdemeanor offense, child
abduction by a relative, which was enacted in 1978 [hereafter
referred to as the 1978 Child Abduction Act].61
III. MARYLAND'S CHILD ABDUCTION ACT OF 1978
The 1978 Child Abduction Act provides as follows:
A relative,62 who is aware that another person is a lawful
custodian 63 of a child, may not:
(1) abduct, take, or carry away a child under 12 years of
age from the lawful custodian;

56. See, e.g., Lee v. People, 53 Colo. 507, 509--510, 127 P. 1023, 1024 (1912); State v.
Farrar, 41 N.H. 53, 58 (1860); State v. Rhoades, 29 Wash. 61, 69, 69 P. 389, 390
(1902).
57. See Foster & Freed, Child Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1016 (1977)
[hereafter cited as FOSTER & FREED].
58. [d. at 1016.
59. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976).
60. See generally Note, The Problem of Parental Kidnapping, 10 WYo. L.J. 225, 226
(1956).
61. Law of May 16, 1978, ch. 435, 1978 Md. Laws 1581 (codified as MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 2A (Supp. 1978)).
62. ",(R]elative' means a parent, other ancestor, brother, sister, uncle, or aunt, or one
who has at some prior time been a lawful custodian." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 2A(b) (Supp. 1978).
63.
"[L]awful custodian" means a person authorized, either alone or together
with another person or persons, to have custody and exercise control
over a child less than 12 years of age at the time and place of an act to
which any provision of this section is, or may be alleged to be,
applicable. The term shall include any person so authorized:
(1) By an order of a court of competent jurisdiction of this State.
(2) By an order of a court of competent jurisdiction of another state,
territory, or the District of Columbia. However, when there has been a
designation of a lawful custodian by an order of a court of this State and
there appears to be a conflict between that order and a custody order
issued by the court of another state or jurisdiction qualifying some other
person as the custodian of the child, the "lawful custodian" is the person
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(2) detain a child under 12 years of age away from the
lawful custodian for more than 48 hours after return is
demanded by the lawful custodian;
(3) harbor or secrete a child under 12 years of age
knowing that the physical custody of the child has been
obtained or retained in violation of this section; or
(4) act as an accessory to any of the actions forbidden in
this section. 64
Subsections (1), (3) and (4) prohibit a parent or relative from
committing the same acts proscribed by the 1876 Child Abduction
Act. 65
A problem unique to the parental child-stealing case is created
by the non-custodial parent's legal right to obtain temporary
possession of the child as a result of exercising visitation privileges.
The 1978 Child Abduction Act added subsection (2), which prohibits
a subsequent detention for more than 48 hours after return is
demanded by the lawful custodian. Presumably, the demand would
be made following the expiration of the time allotted for visitation as
set forth in the custody decree.
Although a parent with visitation rights may be held criminally
responsible for detaining a child after expiration of the visitation
period (provided a return is demanded by the lawful custodian), a
custodial parent who violates a custody decree by denying a parent's
visitation rights is not subject to the new statute. 66 The parties in
appointed by order of a court of this State unless the order of the other
state or jurisdiction:
(i) Is later in date than the order of a court of this State; and
(ii) Was issued in proceedings in which the person appointed by a
custody order of a court of this State either consented to the custody
order entered by the court of the other state or jurisdiction, or
participated ther~in personally as a party.
Id. at § 2A(a).
In construing the word "person," the Maryland Annotated Code directs that
it is to include a corporation, "unless such a construction would be unreasonable." MD. ANN. CODE art. 1, § 15 (1976). See Wesbecker v. State, 240 Md. 41, 48,
212 A.2d 737, 741 (1965). Therefore, the term "lawful custodian" should be
construed broadly to include, for instance, state agencies, hospitals, or private
agencies. C{. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(j) (Supp. 1978)
("Custodian" means a person or agency to whom legal custody of a child has
been given by order of the court, other than the child's parent or legal guardian.).
This construction is reasonable given the power of the juvenile courts to issue
shelter care orders, id. at § 3-815, order emergency medical treatment in
appropriate circumstances, id. at § 3-822, and award custody to a public or
private agency. Id. at § 3-820(b)(2).
64. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c) (Supp. 1978).
65. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
66. This result follows from the language of the 1978 Child Abduction Act, which
prohibits the taking or detention of a child away from the "lawful custodian."
See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra. "Lawful custodian" is defined by the
statute as a person auth6rized to have "custody." See note 63 supra. The term
"custody" connotes more than the mere right of "visitation." E.g., Trompeter v.
Trompeter, 218 Kan. 535, 545 P.2d 297 (1975); McFadden v. McFadden, 206 Or.
253, 261, 292 P.2d 795, 799 (1956).
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these two situations obviously are not similarly situated, and the
state's interest in preserving a stable environment for the child with
the custodial parent may have caused the disparity in treatment. At
least two jurisdictions, nevertheless, have provided criminal penalties for the violation of a parent's visitation rights that are
coextensive with the penalties for violating the custodial parent's
right to custody.67
In addition to adding a new prohibited act under subsection (2),
the 1978 Child Abduction Act has changed the mens rea element of
the child-stealing offense when a relative is involved. It relaxes the
burden shouldered by the prosecution in cases involving parents or
relatives by requiring only that the court find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the offender was "aware that another person is lawful
custodian of [the] child" when the unlawful taking, detention, or
harboring took place. 6H Under the 1876 Child Abduction Act,
however, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused had the intent to deprive the parent or lawful custodian
of custody of the child. 69
The new mens rea element, however, does afford a relative or
parent who is unaware of a court order designating another person
as the lawful custodian a defense to any prosecution under the 1978
Child Abduction Act. Court decisions are in conflict as to whether
this defense is available under statutes similar to Maryland's 1876
Child Abduction Act when a parent takes the child without reason to
know that custody had been judicially awarded to another.70
Two major changes have been wrought into Maryland's childstealing legislation by the 1978 Child Abduction Act. The first
results by statutory construction. The second is by express provision.
First, the 1978 Child Abduction Act will put theory to practice by
removing parents and relatives from the severe criminal sanctions of
the 1876 Child Abduction Act.7l An issue arises as to whether a
relative is subject to both statutes because the particular enactment
of 1978, which is limited to relatives, does not expressly remove
relatives from the general enactment of 1876, which applies to any
person. The answer is mandated by a well-settled rule of statutory

67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 278.5(a) (West Supp. 1979) ("every person who has custody of
a child pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of any court which grants
another person rights to custody or visitation of such child, and who detains or
conceals such child with the intent to deprive the other person of such right ...
shall be punished" to the same degree as one who takes, retains or conceals the
child from its lawful custodian in violation of a custody decree); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-303(2) (Supp. 1978) (a similar provision).
68. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
69. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
70. E.g., State v. Taylor, 125 Kan. 594, 598, 264 P. 1069, 1071 (1928) (defense not
allowed); Hicks v. State, 158 Tenn. 204, 12 S.W.2d 385 (1928) (defense allowed).
71. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
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construction. When there is a particular enactment and a general
enactment which would include what is embraced in the particular,
the particular enactment is operative and is considered an exception
to the general enactment. 72 As applied to criminal statutes, "a
subsequent statute impos[ing] a different penalty for the same, or
practically the same, offense ... repeals the earlier [statute to the
extent of any overlapping inconsistency]. . . whether the penalty is
increased or diminished."73 The result is that the penalties for this
conduct are substantially reduced where the offender is a parent or
relative. Whereas a non-relative offender is subject to a felony
conviction and a maximum sentence of twenty years,74 a parent or
other relative found guilty of the same act is now subject to a
misdemeanor conviction and a maximum penalty of thirty days in
jail and a fifty dollar fine. 75
The second major change is the provision that affords a
"complete" defense to a parent or relative where the following
conditions are met: (1) a petition is filed within 96 hours of the
unlawful act with a Maryland equity courP6 explaining the
circumstances and seeking a modification of the custody order;77 and
(2) the defendant establishes in the criminal court that the action
was taken to protect the child from a "clear and present danger" to
its health, safety or welfare. 78 The statute employs the nondescript
term "complete" to designate the defense. The critical determination
is whether it is a general or an affirmative defense which will then
shift the burden of proof.
A general defense denies an element of the offense. A parent
who takes a child unaware that a court has judicially awarded
custody to another has a general defense under the 1978 Child
Abduction Act because the parent can assert that the mens rea
element of the offense is missing. In such a case, the accused need
merely corne forth with some evidence to controvert the prosecution's
effort to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. 79
An affirmative defense, on the other hand, does not controvert
an element of the offense but asserts that the accused is not
criminally responsible because he has a legal excuse or justifi-

72. Maguire v. State, '192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299, 302 (1949).
73. State v. Gibson, 4 Md. App. 236, 247, 242 A.2d 575, 582, aff'd, 254 Md. 399, 254
A.2d 691 (1968). See Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 158-59 (1854).
74. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976).
75. Id. § 2A(d) (Supp. 1978).
76. Maryland provides its equity courts with exclusive jurisdiction to decide child
custody matters. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1974).
77. The modification petition should be filed pursuant to MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
§ 186(a)(3)(ii) (1976).
78. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(e) (Supp. 1978).
79. See Bradford ~. State, 234 Md. 505, 514, 200 A.2d 150, 155 (1964).
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cation. 80 An affirmative defense requires the accused to establish its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 81 The "complete"
defense of the 1978 Child Abduction Act does not controvert any
element of the offense. It is, rather, in the nature of a justification
and, therefore, it should be deemed an affirmative defense. 82 As a
result, a parent prosecuted under the 1978 Child Abduction Act
should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defense is applicable.
Another source of ambiguity in the 1978 Child Abduction Act is
its "accessory" clause, which provides that "[a] relative ... may not
. . . act as an accessory to any of the actions forbidden in this
section."83 The clause is incongruous on its face. Although Maryland
still recognizes the distinction between principals and accessories in
felony cases,84 the state also follows the common law rule that all
participants who would be classified as principals or accessories
before the fact if the crime was felonious are classified as principals
when the offense is a misdemeanor.85 To the extent the General
Assembly intended to include any relative who aids or abets the
commission of the act, whether or not present at the scene of the
crime, the clause is, at best, redundant. They are all included as
principals under the common law rule.
The "accessory" clause, however, should not apply to any
person, relative or non-relative, who receives, comforts or assists a
perpetrator knowing that a violation of the 1978 Child Abduction
Act has been committed. The Maryland Court of Appeals, following
the common law,86 has defined an accessory after the fact as "one
80.Id.
81. Id. This shifting of the burden to the accused raises a constitutional question
under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court has held that a state may shift the burden of proof in a criminal case from
the state to the accused without violating the due process clause provided:
(1) the state shall have proved enough to make it justfor the defendant
to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation,
or (2) at least that upon a balancing of conveniences the shifting of the
burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the
accused to hardship or oppression.
Morris v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934). See generally Note, Affirmative
Defenses Under New York's New Penal Law, 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44, 47-48
(1968).
82. C{. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 (Page 1975) (designates the same defense an
affirmative defense).
83. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c)(4) (Supp. 1978).
84. Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. 278, 280, 234 A.2d 284, 286 (1967). A principal is one
who commits a crime as a perpetrating actor or one who aids or abets the
commission of the crime while actually or constructively present at the scene of
the crime. Id. An accessory before the fact procures, counsels or commands
another in the commission of the crime but is not actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime. Id.
85. See Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955); Broadway v.
State, 23 Md. App. 68, 78, 326 A.2d 212, 218 (1974).
86. See J. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 77 (1934).
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who, knowing that a felony has been committed, harbors and
protects the felon or renders him any other assistance to elude
punishment."87 The critical element is that a felony must have been
committed. There is no common law penalty for comforting or
aiding a misdemeanant after the crime. 88 The Maryland Court of
Appeals has further proclaimed that the "technical [definition of an
accessory after the fact is] too fundamental in the common law of
crime to be overcome by juridical reasoning."89 The ambiguous
insertion of the "accessory" clause in the 1978 Child Abduction Act
should not serve to overcome the common law rule by implication 90
because the Maryland Constitution requires the General Assembly
to do so expressly.91 To accomplish the purpose of including those
who would be classified as accessories after the fact if the crime were
a felony, the statute should require language expressly providing for
one who harbors, protects or renders any other assistance for the
purpose of eluding punishment to any relative who has violated any
section of the Act.
Notwithstanding the qualified nature of the "accessory" clause
which apparently limits its application to relatives, a non-relative
participant should be subject to the same sanctions. The general rule
is that an aider or abettor is criminally responsible only for those
crimes committed by the perpetrator wliich are the natural or
probable consequence of the crime that was counseled, commanded,
aided or abetted.9 2 If the perpetrator is a parent or other relative, any
relative or non-relative assisting in the commission of the act is
criminally liable as a principal in the misdemeanor offense. 93
If a parent or relative, however, is an accessory to a felonious
taking by a non-relative, the 1978 Child Abduction Act will not
protect the parent or relative from a felony conviction. 94 An unlawful
taking by a non-relative with the intent to deprive the lawful
custodian of custody, or an accessory to that act, remains subject to
the sanctions provided by the 1876 Child Abduction Act. 95
The net result of the 1978 Child Abduction Act is to limit the
sanction for the unlawful taking or detention of a child under twelve
by a parent or other relative to a misdemeanor conviction. Any
87.
88.
89.
90.
.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217-18, 117 A.2d 549, 552 (1955).
Id. at 217, 117 A.2d at 552.
Id. at 218-19, 117 A.2d at 552.
Cf, Agresti v. State, 2 Md. App. 278, 281-82, 234 A.2d 284, 287 (1967) (The
Maryland Court of Appeals is very cautious in interpreting statutes so as not to
give them any greater effect than possible in abrogating the common law rules.).
MD. CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 55 Iowa 321, 7 N.W. 583 (1880); State v. Craft, 338 Mo.
831, 92 S.W.2d 626, 630 (1936); Watts v. State, 5 W. Va. 532, 536 (1872).
See text accompanying note 85 supra.
The accessory clause is limited "to any of the actions forbidden" by the 1978
Child Abduction Act. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2A(c)(4). If the perpetrator is a
non-relative, the 1876 Child Abduction Act applies. Id. § 2 (1976).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 2 (1976).
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person, relative or non-relative, who assists in the commission of the
act should be subject to the same limited sanctions. A non-relative
who unlawfully takes a child under twelve years of age is subject to
the felony sanctions provided by the 1876 Child Abduction Act or
Maryland's kidnapping statutes. 96 If the child is twelve or older, the
kidnapping statutes alone apply. A relative who is an accessory to
one of these felonious takings should be subject to the same felony
sanctions. In no case, however, is a parent guilty of kidnapping. 97 If
a parent unlawfully takes a child twelve or older, the prosecution is
limited to the common law offense of false imprisonmentYM
IV. REMAINING PROBLEMS
Maryland's 1978 Child Abduction Act is limited to an unlawful
taking in violation of a child custody order.99 The statute does not
apply when a parent, sensing an unfavorable resolution of the
custody issue, removes the child to another state before a custody
decree is rendered. In Maryland, both parents have an equal right to
custody of the child HlO so that either may legally take the child until
a court order altering custody is issued. In addition, a custody order
obtained after the parent has left the state with the child should not
create criminal liability on the part of the out-of-state parent even
when a demand for the child has been made. 101 Use of the statute to
hold the out-of-state patent criminally responsible for the mere
detention of the child in another state in violation of the custody
decree would constitute an invalid exercise of extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction. 102
The Texas legislature has uniquely provided for the situation in
which a child is removed to another state after a custody proceeding
is instituted but prior to the time the court issues its decree. The
Texas statute not only prohibits a taking or detention in violation of
a child custody award, but also provides a sanction for the taking of
a child to defeat the court's jurisdiction when a person "has not been
awarded custody of the child by a court of competent jurisdiction
and knows that a suit for divorce, or a civil suit or application for
habeas corpus to dispose of the child's custody, has been filed." 10:1
96. Id. §§ 2, 337, 338.
97. See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 supra.
98. Normally, the detention or carrying away of a person is not unlawful if it is with
the consent of the person taken. See text accompanying note 51 supra. In the
case of a minor, however, courts have held that a detention or carrying away of
the child is, as a matter of law, without the consent of the child when it occurs
without the consent of the lawful custodian, regardless of any evidence to the
contrary. See State v. Farrar, 41 N.H. 53, 59 (1860) (seminal case).
99. See the definition of "lawful custodian" at note 63 supra.
100. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1976).
101. See State v. McCormick, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3005 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1978).
102. Id.
103. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 25.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
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The Maryland General Assembly may be called upon eventually to
incorporate a similar provision into its legislation.
Another question is whether the misdemeanor penalty provided
by the 1978 Child Abduction Act will cause state governors, who at
times have been reluctant to extradite persons for misdemeanor
offenses,104 to refuse to extradite parental kidnappers in these cases.
Some states, aware of the extradition problem, have made parental
child-stealing a felony.105
A more important question is whether states will be able to
effectively locate the abducted children. Commentators and federal
legislators are arguing that federal legislation is needed to assist the
states in this endeavor.106 Solutions proposed include amending the
federal kidnapping statute to impose federal criminal sanctions for
parental kidnapping.107 One argument in support of the federal
criminalization approach to the problem is that it would confer clear
authority for FBI investigation, thus facilitating the location of
abducted children. lOS
V. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the 1978 Child Abduction Act, Maryland
has taken a second legislative step to deter parental child
abductions. Problems, however, still remain. In particular, the
ability of local police forces to locate abducted children without
federal assistance is still a critical question. 109 The case supporting
the General Assembly's response is patent; the real question IS
whether it is enough.

Allan L. Martin

104. See, e.g., State v. McCormick, 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3005, 3006 (Minn. Sup. Ct.
1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 note (Page 1975); FOSTER & FREED, supra
note 57, at 1018.
105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.04 note (Page 1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 25.03 note (Vernon 1974). See COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-304 (1973); KAN. STAT.
§ 21-3422a (Supp. 1978); WYo. STAT. § 6-4-204 (1977). But see [1979] 5 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 1059 (felonization rejected in Virginia).
106. See Coombs, The "Snatched" Child Is Halfway Home In Congress, 11 FAM. L.Q.
407 (1978); FOSTER & FREED, supra note 57, at 1017.
107. The federal kidnapping statute now excludes parents from its ambit. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a) (1952).
108. FOSTER & FREED, supra note 57, at 1017.
109. Cf, Zielenziger, Paternal Kidnapping Leaves Kids Wondering Why Mom and
Dad Can't Behave, The Baltimore Sun, Dec. 20, 1978, § B (Home), at 1, col. 1
(mother of abducted children had to wait for a fortuitous parking violation by
abducting father in Alabama before aducted children who had traveled through
various states could be located and returned to mother in Maryland).

